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As Scotland moved from an eighteenth-century largely feudal and agrarian society to 
a nineteenth-century industrial powerhouse of the Empire, how were the writings of 
Scots writers influenced by the Germans, and what influence did they exert in their 
turn? How, through cultural exchange, were literary tools and concepts refined to deal 
with an epochal shift in concern from the individual to the masses, the subject to the 
state, the hero to the mob, or in metaphorical terms here, the slogan to the clan? 
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Relations between German nineteenth-century Romantic and Scottish 
literatures were of such a long, involved and multiform character that 
it would be difficult to attempt to summarise them in a short chapter. 
Key elements or exemplary moments are difficult to pin down and can 
have a deceptive complexity. As authenticity was a perennial question 
for that age, however, it seems appropriate to make use of a concept 
whose very name has a certain resonance in the literature: the 
fragment. Thus this chapter concentrates on fragmented aspects of 
three Scottish writers whose writing lives spanned more or less 150 
years, and examines the ways in which they were influenced by, or 
exerted an influence upon, German writing. These literary exchanges 
and reciprocities may indeed allow the careful reader to perceive 
enduring and significant trends in Scottish culture at large which 
otherwise would not be apparent. 
The fragments presented are from James Macpherson and the 
effect of the Ossian phenomenon in Germany from 1760 onwards; the 
influence of certain German writers on Thomas Carlyle in the 1820s 
and 30s; and from the 1880s the influence exerted by W. Robertson 
Smith in the field of social anthropology and on Freud, who called 
Smith a “genius” in his Moses and Monotheism (Freud 1964: 1–13). 
Naturally such an abridged and disjointed presentation of historical 
material cannot hope to produce a seamless and comprehensive 
narrative of developments through the period in question. It may be 
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objected that the most glaring omission here is that of Scott and his 
influence on the Germans; for without an acknowledgement and 
proper survey of the shaping of attitudes to history and modernity by 
his work, there is, in effect, no real survey. On the other hand, cannot 
such “rough cuts” as we propose here, provoke, by simple juxtaposi-
tion, new insights about the nature and scale of the epochal shift? The 
sheer immensity of the task for our understanding is kept palpably 
before us here, as by two sudden leaps we move from the early 
Enlightenment, with its concern with the individual subject operating 
within the historical residue of agrarian, feudal and humanistic layers 
of organisation, to writings dealing with the complex mass social 
structures of industrial, imperial and advanced capitalist Britain in the 
late nineteenth century. Carlyle is, in this sense, a midpoint between 
these two poles. Not only does he look to Germany as he wrestles in 
the dark night of his conscience to find an expression suitable – as he 
sees it – for the rapidly changing society of 1830s industrial 
revolutionary Britain, but in his obsession both with heroes and mobs, 
he is precariously balanced between these formal extremes of 
individualism and social complexity. 
The title of the chapter may have aroused some curiosity. I would 
remind readers that these two words “slogan” and “clan” are two of 
the most commonly found Gaelic loan words in West European 
languages. They are of some pedigree: “slogan” (sluagh ghairm – 
battle cry in Gaelic) had its first recorded use in this anglicised form in 
Scott’s Last Minstrel; “clan” was first recorded in Scots/English in 
Douglas’s translation of the Aeneid, and came into German with the 
translation of Humphry Clinker in the 1770s. I would like to propose 
however, that “From slogan to clan”, given the full complement of 
meanings and connotations of those words, does encapsulate 
something of the changing mood from the writings of Macpherson to 
those of W. Robertson Smith, and the different qualities of influence 
they exerted. 
Macpherson
German literary culture was one of those most immediately and 
deeply influenced by the Ossian cult that followed the first publication 
of James Macpherson’s translations in 1760. From 1762 onwards 
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various translations and versions appeared in North Germany: in 
Bremen, Hamburg and Hanover. The first complete translation of 
Ossian into any language (other than English) was produced by 
Michael Denis, a Bavarian Jesuit, and the most famous (and arguably 
the most influential) partial translation is perhaps still Goethe’s 
rendering of the “Songs of Selma” in the novel The Sorrows of Young 
Werther (1774). 
What were the Germans looking for, or what did they find in 
Ossian, that made them so enthusiastic? Tombo, in his short book on 
Ossian in Germany says “there was scarcely a writer of note who did 
not fall under his spell”, and, more specifically, that Ossian himself 
was “endowed with those qualities that constitute the ideal poet of the 
Storm and Stress” (Tombo 1901: 67, 75). 
An examination of the major translations and what they actually 
brought over into German might tell us what they found so 
captivating. The number of different forms used (there are translations 
completely in prose; also some in rhymed verse; in unrhymed verse; 
rhythmic prose laid out as verse; free rhythms mixed with odes; and, 
of course, Denis’ translation in hexameters) suggests that the 
translators found nothing inherently attractive about Macpherson’s 
spare, asyndetic and paratactic prose style. Indeed before beginning 
his translation from Macpherson’s English into German hexameters, 
Denis had only read and conceived his enthusiasm for Ossian through 
Cesarotti’s Italian translation (Cesarotti 1763) done into sciolti – 
unrhymed hendecasyllabic verse in which the “original” stylistic 
qualities of Macpherson are already much attenuated by addition of 
conjunctions and punctuation. Nonetheless some translations like 
those of Goethe (in Werther) and Petersen (Petersen 1782) do preserve 
some specific and important stylistic qualities from Macpherson, like 
the inversions (an attempt by Macpherson to give a Gaelic tone to the 
English) and those aforementioned asyndetic and paratactic qualities. 
Yet if it was not principally Macpherson’s style that the Germans 
found so captivating, then neither could the influence of the 
translations have been based on the subject matter in terms of its 
strictly historical or geographical content. For, as Tombo points out, 
some of the German poets claiming the influence of Ossian were quite 
confused. There was confusion about who the Celts are, or were, and 
what their relationship was to the Nordic peoples, the Goths and 
present day Germans. Gerstenberg, for example, has Fingal not only 
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swearing allegiance to Loda, but praying to Wodan; and in an Ossi-
anic rewriting of the ode Wingolf, Klopstock has Orpheus and the 
Thracians as a tribe of Celts, which oddly, makes them as much 
German as is his Ossian.1
In fact it is precisely the simple and rarefied atmosphere of the 
Ossian poems in these terms – historical and geographical – which 
both guarantee their universality and encourage the sort of fantasies 
noted immediately above. As Hugh Blair wrote, it is the “great 
advantage of Ossian’s mythology that it is not local and temporary” 
(Blair 1765: 38). For what does remain in all the translations is the 
simple diction, the directness of the poet’s voice, the elemental (and 
universal) imagery – the trees, the moor, rock, moss, sea; the clouds, 
the rain, the snow; and the moon and sun – and the extended similes 
and comparisons involving these natural phenomena. This was a 
poetry devoid of abstract ideas, one of immediacy and emotion, a 
“Poetry of the Heart” (Blair 1765: 21) – useful as a slogan, perhaps – 
which thus appealed strongly, as Tombo pointed out, to the Sturm und 
Drang movement with its rebellion against the classical, the 
conventional, and the rational. As Howard Gaskill says: 
it could respond to widely shared inferiority complexes and resentments, serving to 
boost the self confidence of Highlands against Lowlands, Scotland against England, 
the barbarous North (Germany, Scandinavia, Russia) against the classical South 
(France, Italy, Greece). And of course equally it could be used to support the claims 
of the original against the derivative, the natural against the artificial, the ancient 
against the modern, the vigorous against the effete, and therefore the young against 
the old, anarchy against order, freedom against enslavement, spontaneity against 
reflection, inspiration against rules, heart against head, feeling against reason; also 
chastity against perversion […] the (noble) savage against the (corrupt) civilised. It 
could be exploited by the iconoclasts who wished to dispose of the classical canon 
and topple Homer off his pedestal. (Gaskill 1994: 666–67) 
If Ossian was thus in danger of being reduced to some sort of symbol, 
a slogan for rebellious individuals, then his influence as such would 
not be long lived. As W.H. Auden says of Sturm und Drang,
Such a movement has often arisen in history and the consequences have almost 
always been the same; those who embrace it produce some remarkable work at an 
early age but then peter out if they do not, as they often do, take to drink or shoot 
                                                     
1 “Sie sind auch deutschen Stamms”. Wingolf is a rewriting of the classical Ode “An 
meine Freunde” (Klopstock 1887: 5). 
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themselves. An art which pits Nature against Art is bound to be self-defeating. 
(Goethe 1970: 11–12) 
Goethe did produce some remarkable work at an early age (The
Sorrows of Young Werther among it), but he neither shot himself nor 
took to drink. Instead he grew to change his mind on Ossian and his 
presentation of the poetry in Werther. As a more mature writer he 
claimed that Werther only preferred Ossian to Homer in the second 
part of the novel i.e. once he had gone mad (Lamport has pointed out 
that Goethe’s position here is textually unsustainable. Lamport 1998: 
97). Goethe in his early Sturm und Drang years had been encouraged 
in his interest in Ossian by Herder, and at the same time he took an 
interest in the Gothic, writing an article on Gothic architecture which 
was published together with Herder’s Von deutscher Art und Kunst
(later called the “Sturm und Drang manifesto”). When some twelve or 
thirteen years later in the diary of his Italian Journey (an important 
event in Goethe’s conversion to classicism) we find him saying of the 
Gothic “Thank God, I am done with all that junk for good and all” 
(Goethe 1970: 95), we must wonder if he does not dismiss Ossian and 
Werther and everything else connected with that Sturm und Drang
period in this uncharacteristically vehement outburst. 
Tombo tells us that Klopstock’s interest in Ossian did not last 
much longer: 
when his enthusiastic admiration for Ossian subsided and took on a saner aspect, 
when his views on the subject of the relationship of the Celts to the Older German 
tribes assumed a more scientific character, he could not allow Ossian to occupy the 
position assigned him at first. (Tombo 1901: 101) 
Tombo goes on to say that Klopstock’s period of “unbounded 
admiration” lasted no longer than a decade and that for the other 
“Bards”, of whom Gerstenberg, Denis, and Kretschmann were the 
most prominent, “the thing passed into a fad through imitation” 
(Tombo 1901: 103). 
It is interesting to note on this head that Schinkel the architect, 
who sketched Fingal’s cave and was at the time an enthusiastic 
devotee of Gothic architecture, converted to classicism shortly after 
his trip to Scotland. He developed into Germany’s most successful 
classical architect of the nineteenth century and is said by some to 
have been an influence on Glasgow’s Alexander “Greek” Thomson. 
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In spite of these evidences of short-lived enthusiasms, the Ossian 
cult was long lasting in Germany, and there are certain individuals 
who developed deep and authentic approaches to the poetry. Howard 
Gaskill (1994) suggests that more work needs to be done on the 
influence, almost unacknowledged to date (or conveniently forgotten), 
on Jean Paul (Friedrich Richter), Novalis, and especially Hölderlin. 
The first ever translations from the so-called Gaelic originals of 1807 
were done not into English but into German (in 1811) by a 
schoolmaster Christian Wilhelm Ahlwardt (Ahlwardt 1811), who also 
compiled a Gaelic Grammar in German in 1821. It was Herder 
however, who maintained perhaps the longest and most penetrating 
critical relationship with the Ossian texts. He had what seems now a 
most modern insight, and with the twentieth-century ring to his dictum 
“the thought clings to the expression”,2 he could not fail to be 
indignant at Denis’s translations into hexameters which he reviewed 
in Von deutscher Art und Kunst. He was also able to pick out the most 
authentic passages of Gaelic folk poetry hidden away in Macpherson’s 
texts3 (something which many critics contemporary and modern have 
been unable to do), to compile a glossary of Gaelic terms, and publish 
some German versions of the poetry himself. 
Perhaps the overall situation of Ossian in Germany is best 
summed up by Gaskill: 
The writers who were profoundly influenced by him matter and are still read. But one 
imagines that Germany would still have become – for a time – the country of poets, 
thinkers and indeed Celtic scholars, even if Macpherson had never lived. Nor do I 
think Herder’s aesthetic values are strongly dependent on his reception of Ossian. 
Without Macpherson he would still have been pursuing the spirit of folk poetry from 
Latvia to Peru. (Gaskill 1996: 271) 
Carlyle
Carlyle, born in 1795, did not learn German until he took private 
lessons as a twenty-five year old. By the late 1820s and through into 
the early 30s, however, he had already set himself the task of 
“germanising the public” (Norton 1888: letter of 4 June 1827 to John 
                                                     
2 “[…] klebt der Gedanke am Ausdruck” (Herder 1877: 16–17). 
3 Gaskill points out that Herder picks the lamentation of the widow of Dargo – “about 
as genuine as anything in Macpherson’s entire Ossianic corpus” – from a Macpherson 
footnote to send in a sample translation to his fiancé (1996: 265). 
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Carlyle). He went about this in various ways: by translating Goethe’s 
Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1824), writing a short Life of 
Schiller (1825), by writing numerous critical/biographical essays on 
German poets and writers for such journals as the Edinburgh Review,
Fraser’s Magazine and the Foreign Review, and by undertaking to 
compile a History of German Literature (with the help of Goethe). 
This was no easy workload, and nor did Carlyle find the path to his 
literary Valhalla free of grumbling editors and publishers. He had 
disagreements with Jeffrey at the Edinburgh Review about the interest 
value of the Germans,4 and Tait abandoned the publication of the 
History before it was finished on the grounds that “anything German 
is most specially to be avoided” (Froude 1882–84: 243). 
This was of course not the only, nor the greatest, problem that 
Carlyle faced early in his literary career. For in addition to such 
German criticism he was also writing essays of socio-political interest 
such as “Signs of the Times” and “On History”, and here he expressed 
a fear that the world of thought was becoming increasingly polarised. 
By the late 20s and early 30s Scotland was already moving towards 
the great intellectual crisis of the 1843 Disruption. So while on one 
side were those parties getting involved in the schismatic debates 
concerning faith, religion and its relationship to the State, and who 
seemed to ignore the massive social upheaval caused by the rapid 
industrialisation of the country in the nineteenth century, on the other 
were the Utilitarians, following the lead of Smith, Bentham, and Mill, 
who advocated material progress as a cure for social ills but paid little 
if any attention to spiritual or religious questions. Carlyle first tackles 
this problem in the “Signs of the Times” in the Edinburgh Review in 
1829, where he designates the two poles as pertaining respectively to 
the dynamic and mechanical nature of man. As Carlyle sees it there 
has been too much of a concentration on man’s mechanical nature and 
not enough emphasis placed on the dynamic, or as we might say, 
spiritual nature. Each of these two poles forms, as he says, “but half a 
picture” (Carlyle 1839: 250), and Carlyle seems to be seeking a way 
                                                     
4 Bertrand Russell says of this period, “Throughout the period from Kant to Nietzsche, 
professional philosophers in Great Britain remained almost completely unaffected by 
their German contemporaries, with the sole exception of Sir William Hamilton, who 
had little influence. Coleridge and Carlyle, it is true, were profoundly affected by 
Kant, Fichte and the German Romantics, but they were not philosophers in the 
technical sense”. (Russell 1946: 740) 
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in which thought and writing can deal with both the material and the 
spiritual at the same time. 
The analysis which Carlyle gives of Mechanism and its one-
sided and all-pervasive influence on the culture and society of the time 
is very lucid and powerful, but unfortunately when he attempts to 
persuade us of the need for a greater balance and emphasis on the 
dynamic, he is unconvincing. His method is more to tell us about 
rather than to show us this dynamic alternative, and it seems, at times, 
that he doth protest too much. Could he be said simply to fall back on 
a stereotypically harsh and disapproving Presbyterian heritage in the 
preachiness of his tone here? And if so, is that because the standard 
rational prose of the critic, which was rigorous enough to expose the 
Mechanistic problem, is, in a word, simply not a sufficiently supple 
and dynamic tool to work up an inspiration in us for his complemen-
tary vision? We might indeed say that in this essay we see the first 
ominous evidence of what A.J.P. Taylor described as Carlyle’s “ideas 
spluttering and half-formed, ideas of revolt and rejection with nothing 
constructive to follow” (Taylor 1976: 59). In effect, writings as a form 
of slogan. At any rate, Carlyle himself seems aware of his literary 
shortcomings here, when at the beginning of the section dealing with 
the dynamic, he admits to “speak[ing] a little pedantically” (Carlyle 
1839: 240). 
If “Signs of the Times” was at the least a lucid posing of the 
problem then the first real answering to the questions it raised could 
be said to come with the completion of Sartor Resartus in 1831 
(published in complete form in 1836). Sartor Resartus is important 
not only for what it says, but how it says it. Carlyle had by this time 
developed a poetic, and it must be said, dynamic style which he calls a 
“Babylonish Dialect”. It has cosmic scope, is rhapsodic and affected, 
makes use of satire, invective and irony, and thus is an answer in itself 
to the plodding Mechanistic problem. To some extent it can be shown 
that he developed this style through his readings of German writers 
(although there are of course other very important influences, such as 
his strict Presbyterian background, and Biblical influences). Thus with 
those early essays of the late 1820s and early 30s he may be said not 
only to have been “germanising the public” but also germanising 
himself.
Carlyle’s reading of German authors was very wide ranging but 
we may here take a brief look at some of the most important 
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influences, namely Goethe, Novalis, Jean Paul Friedrich Richter and 
Kant. Goethe was always an inspirational figure for Carlyle, and they 
carried out a correspondence principally between 1827–31.5 The 
spiritual conversion which Carlyle describes as occurring in Sartor
Resartus between the chapters “The Everlasting No” and “The 
Everlasting Yea” was effected in him personally by his careful reading 
and translation of Goethe’s Bildungsroman Wilhelm Meister’s 
Apprenticeship (1824). Carlyle was going through a spiritual crisis, 
having doubts and ultimately giving up on his Presbyterian faith, and 
this book let him see new possibilities of self realisation through an 
active and socially useful life. Goethe as a pacific, all-encompassing 
genius who has command of all fields of knowledge and experience 
can be seen as an inspiration for the character of Teufelsdröckh in 
Sartor Resartus. There we have an all-knowing, all-seeing professor 
living in a small provincial town: is it Weimar or Weissnichtwo, 
Teufelsdröckh or Goethe? 
Novalis was influenced by Friedrich Schlegel who developed 
certain Romantic ideas and forms from a reading of the German 
theorist Wolff. Wolff was one of the first critics to propose that the 
“Iliad” was not composed by one single poet “Homer” but by many 
poets acting as poet-critics in a tradition and progressing the body of 
work through their own critical reading of it and poetic intervention in 
it (Martin 1994: 82). The Romantics, led by Schlegel, developed two 
important concepts from this critical reading. 
Firstly, that of the Open Work: the literary work as progressive 
and dynamic, involving the critical and poetic impulses of many 
hands. Examples include the Iliad and the Bible: works that oppose 
the complete, finished ideal of the single-authored classical literary 
work. The second concept, which derives from this, is that of the 
fragment. If individual authority in a work is always limited then it 
follows that each poet’s contribution can only ever be a fragment. The 
fragment is thus always a key to some ineffable infinite which lies 
beyond the scope of literary delineation. German Romantic artists 
from Novalis to Goethe exploited the form of the fragment in working 
out the ironic stance of a self-contained autonomy as part of a greater 
totality – it was thus of use to Carlyle in his concern for both heroes 
                                                     
5 A.J.P Taylor noted of Carlyle, that “It sheds a quaint light on the two languages that 
Goethe, that most classical of German writers, should have inspired the most uncouth 
writer of English” (Taylor 1976: 59). 
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and mobs. These German Romantic artists used the form as an 
opportunity to adopt simultaneously both a subjective and an objective 
viewpoint. The highest development of the form is perhaps seen in 
Nietzsche’s aphorisms. 
A fairly straightforward case can be made for the influence of 
these ideas on the structure of Sartor Resartus. The book is ostensibly 
about Teufelsdröckh’s “Philosophy of Clothes”, a philosophy that 
would explain everything. Yet we never see the whole text, which 
remains in one sense at least ineffable. Instead we are treated to 
fragments, contributions critical and poetic, from the editor, from 
Teufelsdröckh himself, from Teufelsdröckh’s friend, from written 
notes in paper bags, and so on, which all provide a key to that 
ineffable infinite. 
To see how directly Novalis’s style might have influenced 
Carlyle, we need only compare the following opening paragraph of 
Novices at Sais with Sartor Resartus, and especially Carlyle’s chapter 
of “Symbols”: 
Various are the roads of man. He who follows and compares them will see strange 
figures emerge, figures which seem to belong to that great cipher which we discern 
written everywhere, in wings, eggshells, clouds and snow, in crystals and in stone-
formations, on ice-covered waters, on the inside and outside of mountains, of plants, 
beasts and men, in the lights of heaven, on scored disks of pitch or glass, or in iron 
filings round a magnet, and in strange conjunctures of chance. In them we suspect a 
key to the magic writing, even a grammar, but our surmise takes on no definite forms 
and seems unwilling to become a higher key. (Novalis [1949] 2005: 3–5)
Here we have the “great cipher”, somewhat like the unseen, unseeable, 
infinite “Philosophy of Clothes”. And all these “figures” listed give a 
“key” to “the grammar”, and remind us of Carlyle’s statement that 
“Rightly viewed no meanest object is insignificant; all objects are 
windows, through which the philosophic eye looks into infinitude 
itself” (Carlyle 1840: 72). 
Jean Paul Friedrich Richter, humorist novelist and critic, might 
be said to be the Laurence Sterne of German literature. Carlyle wrote 
two essays on Richter, one for the Edinburgh Review in 1827 and 
another for the Foreign Review in 1830, and it is significant that there 
he places greater emphasis on analysis of style, where in his essays on 
Goethe and Novalis, for example, he tends to look more for meaning 
or message. A short passage from each essay may demonstrate this: 
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There are few writers with whom deliberation and careful distrust of first impressions 
are more necessary than with Richter. He is a phenomenon from the very surface; he 
presents himself with a professed and determined singularity; his language itself is a 
stone of stumbling to the critic; to critics of the grammarian species, an unpardonable, 
often an insuperable rock of offence. Not that he is ignorant of grammar, or disdains 
the science of spelling and parsing; but he exercises both in a certain latitudinarian 
spirit; deals with astonishing liberality in parentheses, dashes, and subsidiary clauses; 
invents hundreds of new words, alters old ones, or by hyphen chains and pairs and 
packs them together into the most jarring combination; in short, produces sentences of 
the most heterogeneous, lumbering, interminable kind. Figures without limit! Indeed 
the whole is one tissue of metaphors, and similes, and allusions to all provinces of 
Earth, Sea, and Air; interlaced with epigrammatic breaks, vehement bursts, or 
sardonic turns, interjections, quips, puns, and even oaths! A perfect Indian jungle it 
seems; a boundless, unparalleled imbroglio; nothing on all sides but darkness, 
dissonance, confusion worse confounded! (Carlyle 1855: 10)
and,
Probably there is not in any modern language so intricate a writer; abounding, without 
measure, in obscure allusions, in the most twisted phraseology; perplexed into endless 
entanglements and dislocations, parenthesis within parenthesis; not forgetting elisions, 
sudden whirls, quips, conceits and all manner, yet nowise in what seem military lines, 
but rather in huge parti-coloured mob-masses. (Carlyle 1855: 197) 
Two very important points are clear from these cited passages: Firstly, 
that here we have Carlyle not only providing a definition of Jean 
Paul’s style but also attempting to create an example of that very style 
which he seeks to define. Are not Carlyle’s own sentences here 
“intricate” with “the most twisted phraseology”, does he not perplex 
the definition into “endless entanglements and dislocations”? “Figures 
without limit!” is surely one of these “vehement bursts” itself, and as 
for “obscure allusions”, what about “a perfect Indian Jungle” with an 
Italian “unparalleled imbroglio” wrapped around it?
This can be read as a definition not only of Jean Paul’s style, but 
also of Carlyle’s mature style as it is found in Sartor Resartus and the 
French Revolution. For here, in a confusing but planned poetic 
jumble, “a stone of stumbling to the critic”, the author himself, his 
personal dynamism, is ever-present and linked through figures of 
“metaphors and similes and allusions” to a cosmic scope of “Earth, 
Sea and Air”. During the year (1830) of the writing of Sartor Resartus
we see him thus practising again a style which he had first attempted 
in 1827 and which allows him to charm the Mechanistic Universe, 
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given that “Not our Logical, Mensurative faculty, but our Imaginative 
one is King over us” (Carlyle 1840: 225). 
Carlyle was an enthusiastic expounder of German Idealism, 
especially in his immature and early mature writings. We find him 
setting out his versions of that philosophy in the early critical essays, 
the philosophico-fictive Sartor Resartus, and the Histories. Indeed, we 
only get as far as page six of the three-volume French Revolution
before he audaciously implies that the whole Gallic affair was 
underpinned by German philosophy. Carlyle’s version of German 
Idealism consisted more or less of ideas from Kant, conflated with 
those of Fichte and Schelling, and blended with his own idiosyncratic 
brand of spiritualism. Indeed while Rene Wellek (1931) admits that 
Carlyle probably did more than anyone else to make England 
“receptible” for German idealism, he suggests that what Carlyle 
expounded as such was more Carlyle than Kant. Wellek implies that 
Carlyle had never in fact properly read Kant, saying that Carlyle relied 
“mostly” on “second hand reports” (Wellek 1931: 200). Both Wellek 
and Froude claim that, in fact, Carlyle never got beyond page 150 of 
the Critique of Pure Reason: starting it in order to “allay his fears”
about his impending wedding to Jane Welsh but then abandoning it 
when it became “too abstruse” for him (Froude 1882–84: 375). 
But whatever Carlyle’s sources: Kant’s writings, other writers’ 
expositions of Kant and German Idealism (notably Novalis), or his 
own brand of spirituality; and whatever the truth, misrepresentation, 
and intellectual soundness of Carlyle’s “Kanteanism”, the fact is that 
he did not hesitate to exploit his own version of these ideas in all 
forms of his writings. To take an example first from his early critical 
essays, that on Novalis in the Foreign Review in 1829: 
The Idealist, again, boasts that his Philosophy is Transcendental, that is, “ascending 
beyond the senses”; which, he asserts, all Philosophy, properly so called, by its nature 
is and must be: and in this way he is led to various unexpected conclusions. To a 
Transcendentalist, Matter has an existence, but only as a Phenomenon: were we not 
there, neither would it be there; it is a mere Relation, or rather the result of a Relation 
between our living Souls and the First Cause; and depends for its apparent qualities on 
our bodily and mental organs; having itself no intrinsic qualities; being, in the 
common sense of that word, Nothing. The tree is green and hard, not of its own 
natural virtue, but simply because my eye and hand are fashioned so as to discern 
such and such appearances under such and such conditions. (Carlyle 1839: 203)
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This essay was written in the same year as “Signs of the Times” in 
which we see a similar lucid and rational prose style. If we turn now 
to a couple of excerpts from Sartor Resartus completed in 1831, and 
therefore after the final 1830 essay on Jean Paul’s style, we see again 
an expounding of Carlyle’s Kantean ideas, but in a completely 
different style from their presentation in the 1829 Novalis essay. 
But deepest of all illusory Appearances, for hiding Wonder, as for many other ends, 
are your two grand fundamental world-enveloping Appearances, SPACE and TIME. 
These, as spun and woven for us from before Birth itself, to clothe our celestial ME 
for dwelling here, and yet, to blind it – lie all embracing, as the universal canvas, or 
warp and woof, whereby all minor Illusions, in this Phantasm Existence, weave and 
paint themselves. In vain, while here on Earth, shall you endeavour to strip them off; 
you can, at best, but rend them asunder for moments, and look through. […] Believe 
what thou findest written in the Sanctuaries of Man’s Soul, even as all Thinkers, in all 
ages, have devoutly read it there: that TIME, and SPACE are not God, but creations 
of God; that with God as it is a universal HERE, so it is an everlasting NOW. (Carlyle 
1840: 265–66)
Here we have a presentation of Carlyle’s own (spiritualised) version 
of German Idealism, meshed with “astonishing liberality” in that 
dynamic style, the “Babylonish Dialect”, of which he’d learned so 
much from Jean Paul. Turning now to the French Revolution (1837) 
we can see how he develops this happy marriage of Kant and Jean 
Paul to its most mature expression: 
For ours is a most fictile world; and man is the most fingent plastic of creatures. A 
world not fixable: not fathomable! An unfathomable Somewhat, which is Not we; 
which we can work with, and live amidst, – and model, miraculously in our 
miraculous Being, and name World. – But if the very Rocks and Rivers (as 
Metaphysics teaches) are, in strict language, made by those outward Senses of ours, 
how much more, by the Inward Sense, are all Phenomena of the spiritual kind: 
Dignities, Authorities, Holies, Unholies! Which inward Sense, moreover, is not 
permanent like the outward ones, but forever growing and changing. Does not the 
Black African take of Sticks and Old Clothes (say exported Monmouth Street cast-
clothes) what will suffice, and of those, cunningly combining them, fabricate for 
himself an Eidolon (Idol or Thing Seen), and name it Mumbo-Jumbo; which he can 
thenceforth pray to, with upturned awestruck eye, not without hope? The white 
European mocks; but ought rather to consider; and see whether he, at home, could not 
do the like a little more wisely. (Carlyle 1837: 6) 
Here the style has with its “certain latitudinarian spirit” completely 
stifled any clear expression of content. The “German Idealism” is a 
substructure clothed in the prose such that it is only exposed in a par-
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enthetical reminder that “Metaphysics” are under all this somewhere. 
What Carlyle has managed to do is to sublimate completely his own 
Presbyterian urge to preach, and in effect he has created a dynamic 
and organic unity of content and style. To attempt a Carlylean-style 
metaphor: might it not be said that on a certain stylistic level what we 
have in the French Revolution is a warp of Richterian prose woven 
through the woof of a homespun Kanteanism?
William Robertson Smith 
By the 1890s Scotland had moved some way beyond that period of 
schismatic debates about faith, religion and their relationship to the 
State that had characterised the era of the Disruption. But it was 
emerging as a very different country from eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century Scotland: 1872 had brought the Education Act, in 
1886 the position of the Secretary of State for Scotland was 
established in the British Government, and the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress was to be formed in 1897. This was no longer a nation built 
around a church that governed the welfare and education of its people, 
but a Scotland that was more truly a constituent part of the modern 
British State. However, not everything of these schismatic debates 
which had seemed to Carlyle to ignore the great social upheavals of 
the time (“Hebrew Old Clothes” was his characteristic comment) was 
lost in self-regarding oblivion. In fact one of the great international 
successes of those years was the contribution of W. Robertson Smith, 
whose work proves that the Scottish Presbyterian tradition was still 
able to make a distinct, important and unique contribution to the 
formation of modern twentieth-century thought.
From the late 1840s onwards many Free Church theologians had 
started to turn towards Germany for theological guidance. By the 
1860s when Robertson Smith was studying, Calvinist theology was 
under question and students at the New College in Edinburgh were 
encouraged to attend Somersemester and to acquaint themselves with 
German biblical criticism. Robertson Smith went to Bonn in 1867 and 
studied under Adolf Kamphausen; in 1869 he was in Gottingen 
studying metaphysics under Hermann Lotze, theological ethics under 
Albrecht Ritschl, and Old Testament theology with Ernst Bertheau; 
and in 1872 he was again in Gottingen to study Arabic with Paul de 
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Lagarde. An idea of the importance which Robertson Smith himself 
attached to these studies can be gained from comments in his letters, 
where he says, “Bonn and Gottingen had quite as much to do with my 
theological education as the T.M. [Training for the Ministry]” 
(Kinnear 1995: 95), and, when with reference to the later libel case 
against him by the Free Church, he calls Ritschl “the Urvater of the 
Aberdeen Heresy” (Rogerson: 1995: 79). A fuller appreciation of the 
influence of these German thinkers and theologians and others than 
can be sketched out here is to be found in J.W. Rogerson’s The Bible 
and Criticism in Victorian Britain, (1995) where the author establishes 
that one of the greatest influences on Smith was his reading of Zur
Dogmathik by the theologian Rothe, who died in 1867. 
Smith contributes to modern thought in many important ways, 
but we will look here in particular at his influence on Sigmund Freud, 
specifically through his work on the history of the Semitic peoples and 
religions and on his questioning of Moses’ authorship of the 
Pentateuch. Freud cited Smith’s work often and extensively, 
especially in Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism. There are 
three points which may be considered of some significance in this 
connection.
The first is that while Hume had admitted that it was possible to 
establish a common sense basis for both a system of morals and of 
physics, he denied that it was so in the case of organised religion. 
Both parties at the extremes of the Disruption debates, the 
Evangelicals and the atheists, agreed with this point, although for 
different reasons. As a moderate Presbyterian Robertson Smith felt it 
incumbent upon himself to prove that such a common sense basis 
could indeed be established. One way to do this was to show the 
continuities between Presbyterian theology and ancient social practice, 
which he did by using the Presbyterian rejection of transubstantiation 
as the basis of his researches into the ancient Totem Meal. 
Comparisons between Judaism and the Old-Testament-based Scots 
religion are fairly commonplace (in, for example, Carlyle’s comments 
about “Hebrew Old Clothes” and in writers such as Heine) but 
Smith’s project for a scientific theology bears a particularly strong 
resemblance to the eighteenth-century Jewish Enlightenment of Moses 
Mendelssohn, which sets out to establish the rational basis of all 
Judaic precepts and laws (see Arkush 1994). One might speculate that 
little of this resemblance would have been lost on Freud, a secularised 
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Viennese Jew, in his reading of Smith. What is less speculative is the 
influence of Smith’s work in Germany, through friendships and 
confederacies (notably with Julius Wellhausen), and also later in 
France through the readings of the sociologist Émile Durkheim. Smith 
was working to show that religion, and sacrifice in particular, arose 
not out of an attempt to appease implacable and capricious powers but 
out of a relationship of love with a benevolent God. The fact that 
someone like Sigmund Freud could use Smith’s results for his own 
lifelong campaign against organised religion would not, however, 
have surprised traditionalist Presbyterians such as Dr Alexander Duff 
(see Walls 1995) who thought Smith’s work was undermining a belief 
in the infallible truth of Scripture,
The second point is that Smith, as a believing critic who held that 
the Old Testament was a record of progressive revelation of God to 
the nation of Israel, considered that the study of the historical and 
social context of the divine action was fundamentally important to 
understanding the Bible. It was thus that his researches turned to the 
Holy Land (and the Arabian Peninsula, which he saw as the original 
territory of the Semitic peoples) and to the religion of the Ancient 
Semites. One of the results of this research was to show how the 
structure of relationships between ritual, belief, dogma, and myth in 
ancient religion differed from that of the positivist faiths. 
This can be seen in his Lectures on the Religion of the Semites in
which Smith contends that “ the antique religions had for the most part 
no creed; they consisted entirely of institutions and practices,” and 
that as a consequence, their rituals were “connected not with a dogma 
but a myth” (Smith 1889: 16–17). “It must however be remembered”, 
Smith insists, “that in ancient religion there was no authoritative 
interpretation of ritual. It was imperative that certain things should be 
done, but every man was free to put his own meaning on whatever 
was done” (Smith 1889: 399): 
Ancient religion was so entirely ruled by precedent that men did not deem it necessary 
to have an adequate moral explanation of even the most exorbitant demands of 
traditional ritual; they were content to explain them by some legend that told how the 
ritual first came to be set up. (Smith 1889: 409)
It is quite a simple step from these findings, which establish rite as 
more fundamental and chronologically prior to myth, to set up a rough 
analogy between Smith’s analysis of the structure of Ancient Religion 
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and Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. In this reading ritual is seen as a 
sort of collective compulsive neurotic act and myth (like the work of 
analysis) a retroactive explanation emerging from the collective 
unconscious. Indeed on the first page of Totem and Taboo Freud 
makes it clear that he is aware of these similarities: 
a comparison between the psychology of primitive peoples, as it is taught by social 
anthropology, and the psychology of neurotics, as it has been revealed by 
psychoanalysis, will be bound to show numerous points of agreement and will throw 
new light upon familiar facts in both these sciences. (Freud 1985: 53)
Freud makes extensive use of W. Robertson Smith’s research 
material, and even makes a six-page resume of his findings in the 
“Return to Totemism” chapter of Totem and Taboo. But where Smith 
organises his work into what might be crudely described as a dialectic 
of historico-critical character, mapping out man’s gradual coming to 
dominion over the natural world, Freud absorbs the material into his 
own idiosyncratic mytho-psychoanalytical canon. Robertson Smith 
follows Julius Wellhausen in seeing the ancient religion, even with its 
sacrificial feasts, as a joyous thing (see Wellhausen [1885] 1957) in 
which there is little of guilt or atonement (this comes later with the 
development of private property, individuality, and in the Hebrew 
case, with various political disasters). Freud however, asserts both in 
Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism that the slaughter of the 
totem animal and the totem meal are a commemoration in communal 
guilt of the original slaughter of the tribal father.6 Freud argues in 
Totem and Taboo, that “Psychoanalysis has revealed that the totem 
animal is in reality a substitute for the father” (Freud 1985: 202), and 
in Moses and Monotheism that, 
                                                     
6 Durkheim argued in Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1915), that although some 
writers (e.g. Tyler in Primitive Culture and Wilken in Het Animisme bij den Volken 
van den Indischen Archipel) saw totemism not as the most elementary religion but as 
a special form of the cult of ancestors, this is only because they take their evidence 
from societies which have passed the stage of pure totemism to a decadent form. 
Freud also seems to believe here that totemism is not an elementary form of religion, 
but one derived from the cult of ancestors. Durkheim points out for example, that the 
purest form of totemism is found in Australian societies among whom 
metempsychosis is unknown. He also points out that in totemism it is not the actual 
animal or plant that is worshipped, but the emblem or image of the totem, “Now 
between this religion of the emblem and the ancestor-cult, there is no connection 
whatsoever” (Durkheim [1915] 2001: 128). 
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The first decisive step towards a change in this sort of “social” organisation seems to 
have been that the expelled brothers, living in a community, united to overpower their 
father and, as was the custom in these days, devoured him raw (Freud 1985: 325) 
These assertions fly in the face of Robertson Smith’s conclusion from 
the same material. Namely, that within one totemic clan the same sort 
of being, or spirit, was seen as belonging equally to the non-
anthropomorphic deity, the totem animal, and the worshippers, but 
that when this Totem system fell into abeyance and was gradually 
replaced with the institution of property, then the worshippers 
performing the same prescribed rites could no longer understand the 
familial or shared blood references to the sacrificial animal. According 
to Smith: 
I apprehend, therefore, that human sacrifice is not more ancient than the sacrifice of 
ancient animals, and that the prevalent belief of ancient heathenism, that animal 
victims are an imperfect substitute for a human life, arose from a false inference from 
traditional forms of ritual that ceased to be understood […] when the full kinship of 
animals with men (The Totem System) was no longer recognised in ordinary life, all 
this became unintelligible, and was explained by the doctrine that at the altar the 
victim took the place of a man. (Smith 1889: 365)
While Robertson Smith can in many ways be seen as the founder of 
the modern sociology of religion, his almost exclusive advocacy of the 
totemic system and the joyous sacrifice that goes with it was largely 
rejected as a model by later scholars. This is the view of T.O. 
Beidelman:
Undisputably, Smith was a major figure in creating a popular interest in totemism. 
Freud and Durkheim accepted Smith’s data uncritically, even though Smith’s 
scholarly evidence for early mother-right and totemism is very questionable and 
discredited today. His was a kind of reconstruction based on the worst forms of 
conjectural history founded on the doctrine of survivals. Certainly his insistence that 
early man was totemic in religion and never polytheistic, much less monotheistic is 
now generally rejected. Smith presents his own theory of sacrifice as essentially 
related to totemism and he relates what he considers the primordial form of sacrifice 
to communal and commensual rites deriving from a sacrificial devouring of a totem 
by those who venerate it. (Beidelman 1974: 37–38)
Beidelman then goes on to deal with the question of the “joyous” 
sacrifice, quoting from Thompson’s 1963 study, 
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In his useful survey Thompson notes: “Most of the scholars reviewed have conceded 
that expiation had a larger place in early Israelite sacrifice than the Wellhausen school 
allowed, but none of them have (sic) devoted to it, a systematic and methodological 
investigation.” Indeed he provides an extensive list of recent biblical researchers who 
have found the joyous sacrifice theory untenable and the theme of solemnity and 
expiation the dominant one in Old Testament sacrifice. (Beidelman 1974: 55) 
In fact in Moses and Monotheism, Freud declares that for his earlier 
Totem and Taboo he made use of theoretical ideas put forward by 
“Darwin, Atkinson, and particularly by Robertson Smith” but 
specifies that the killing and eating of the patriarch by the sons was an 
idea he took from J.J. Atkinson (Freud 1985: 379). At any rate Freud 
here is evidently more closely aligned with the ultimate orthodoxy 
than with Smith. Durkheim, for example, (whose Elementary Forms 
of the Religious Life was published in its original French version in 
1912, a year before Totem and Taboo) found that oblation and 
expiation were as important to sacrifice as communion, and explicitly 
criticised Smith and his rejection of the theory of animal substitution 
for original human sacrifice as “false inference”. According to 
Durkheim, “it is inadmissible that beliefs and practices as universal as 
these, which we find at the basis of the expiatory sacrifice, should be 
the product of a simple error of interpretation” (Durkheim [1915] 
2001: 307). 
The final point concerns W. Robertson Smith’s use of the word 
“clan”: this aspect of Smith’s work remains important, as, in 
Beidelman’s words, “group-held, communal values epitomised 
primitive life and thought” (Beidelman 1974: 39). Clearly, as an 
Aberdeenshire Scot, Smith had easy access to this word “clan” and 
was familiar with the concept behind its native use. It appears 
however that it was the Americans who were first to employ this word 
in the anthropological context through Albert Gallatin’s studies of 
North American Indigenous peoples (Gallatin 1836: 109).7 J.F. 
McLennan, Robertson Smith’s friend and colleague, and a fellow 
Scotsman, notes Gallatin’s use of the term in his seminal article on 
Totemism in The Fortnightly Review (Mclennan 1869: 70). In this 
context it is adapted as a specifically scientific term, and in a way 
which may be said to prefigure much of the language and thought of 
                                                     
7 Swiss-born Gallatin was Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury, managing 
the Louisiana Purchase for Jefferson and serving also under Madison. He was also the 
founder of the American Ethnological Society. 
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late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century modernism.8 With Smith 
for example, “clan” denotes a specific level of social organisation, 
namely one that might be said to be supra-family but sub-tribal: 
the notion that the clan is only a larger household is not consistent with the results of 
modern research. Kinship is an older thing than family life, and in the most primitive 
societies known to us the family or household group was not a subdivision of the clan, 
but contained members of more than one kindred. (Smith 1889: 277)
The word “clan” here signifies that these ancient peoples had complex 
social structures, integral in this case to the Totem system. Totemism 
as a concept has however been largely discredited by more recent 
anthropologists, who regard their predecessors’ attempts at defining 
and delineating the “primitive” as “abnormal” and separate from 
“civilised” man as products of an outdated politics. As such it is surely 
no accident that this word “clan” was adapted (or adaptable) for 
anthropological use from the language of a marginalised European 
people, who for centuries were themselves treated by their nearest 
mainstream European neighbours as evolutionary throw-backs. And 
given the history of oppression and denial which that people faced, it 
is perhaps less than surprising that this lexical borrowing has rarely, if 
ever, been explicitly acknowledged in the literature.9
If in his writings Smith confirms the anthropological orthodoxy 
of the word “clan” then he uses this word and views the concept in a 
very different sense from the eighteenth- (and early nineteenth-) 
century Enlightenment or Romantic sense. In the eighteenth century’s 
gradual working out of bourgeois subjectivity it was the individual 
rather than the social structure that generally presented more interest. 
Indeed, as John Dwyer has pointed out, there were no “clans” at all in 
Macpherson’s ideal world of the Gaelic past. Macpherson’s attempt to 
establish that a society of magnanimous, sympathetic, “feeling” indi-
                                                     
8Although Mclennan does at this stage only quote Gallatin using the word “clan”, and 
himself employs various terms, including families, gentes, stock, stock-tribes, persons 
of one stock, stock-names, bands, and confusingly, tribes, to refer to this social 
structure.
9 It is notable, even shameful, in this respect that although many if not most of the 
writers, (including both Durkheim and Freud) give definitions, etymologies and 
commentaries on the use of the loan word “totem” (ododem), similar discussion on 
the origins of the word “clan” (except sometimes to say that it is an “English” word) 
are extremely rare (this writer has never found an adequate one). 
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viduals like Ossian could exist in a “barbaric” or pre-Enlightenment 
era meant of course that he had to show that lineage and other formal 
or legalistic relations “counted for very little and love a lot” (Dwyer 
1991: 170). Moderate clergymen like Hugh Blair may have been 
pleased to see in the image of the Ossianic Bard a role for themselves 
as one who would temper the ratio-scientific character of the Scottish 
Enlightenment by discovering “the emotional springs of action” and 
manipulating “the passions in the interest of a more general 
benevolence and humanity” (Dwyer 1991: 175). 
William Robertson Smith himself may be seen as a later 
representative of this same moderate tradition, but nonetheless, with 
the scientific adaptation of the word “clan”, his common sense 
approach takes on a more formalistic, proto-modern aspect. Indeed it 
is this idea of “clan” as a determinist model in social anthropology, as 
a complex pre-existing structure which is “always already” there and 
only within which the discernible primitive “individual” as such can 
be encountered, that prefigures so much of modernist thought in the 
early twentieth century. One need only think here of Saussure and the 
“sign” in structural linguistics; Marxism and “class” in historical 
materialism; of the “world” and its implemental determinism in 
Heidegger’s existentialism; and of course, Freud and the “uncon-
scious” in psychoanalysis. When Freud himself follows W. Robertson 
Smith in the use of the word and concept “clan” it is definitely not to 
be used as a mere slogan but as a significantly more subtle political 
tool.
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